In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley [3] describe an algorithm which finds a stable marriage in O(n 2 ) communication rounds. Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each player is represented by a single processor. The complexity measure of such a distributed algorithm is typically measured by the round complexity, assuming all processors can communicate simultaneously in each round, or in terms of synchronous running time.
Introduction
In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley [3] consider the following problem. A group of n men and n women each rank all of the members of the opposite sex. The men and women (which we collectively call players) wish to form a marriage-a one-to-one correspondence between the men and women-which is stable in the sense that no pair of players mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners in the marriage. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable marriage always exists by giving an explicit algorithm for finding one. The centralized GaleShapley algorithm runs in time O(n 2 ). This run-time is asymptotically optimal for centralized algorithms, as even specifying preferences for all men and women requires storing 2n ordered lists of n names.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm, where each player is represented by a separate processor which privately holds that player's preferences. 1 In the distributed computational model with complete preferences, each player can broadcast their preferences to all other players in O(n) rounds, after which each player runs a centralized version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. While this process requires only O(n) communication rounds, the synchronous distributed run-time is still Θ(n 2 ) in the worst case.
The men propose and women accept/reject proposals in batches by quantizing their preferences. A marriage is then constructed by finding large matchings among the accepted proposals. We believe this approach for the (almost) stable marriage problem is novel.
In our analysis of ASM we introduce a metric structure on the set of preferences for the stable marriage problem. This metric has the property that given preferences P and an almost stable marriage M , M is also almost stable for preferences P ′ which are "close" to P. Using this metric, we show that the marriage produced by ASM is almost stable. Specifically, we show that the sequence of proposals, acceptances and rejections produced by ASM is consistent with an execution of the classical Gale-Shapley on (different) preferences which are close to the original preferences for ASM. Thus we achieve the desired approximation guarantee by comparing an execution of our approximate algorithm to an execution of an exact algorithm on a related input. To our knowledge, this technique has not previously been applied to approximately stable matching algorithms.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the background necessary to describe the ASM algorithm. In Section 3, we explicitly describe the algorithm ASM and its subroutines. Section 4 contains proofs of the performance guarantees of ASM. Specifically, Theorem 1.1 is an immediate consequence of the run-time guarantee (Theorem 4.1) and approximation guarantee (Theorem 4.3). Finally, in Section 5, we discuss extensions and open problems related to our results.
Preliminaries

The stable marriage problem
We consider the stable marriage problem as originally described by Gale and Shapley [3] with unacceptable partners (cf. [4, 8] ). Let X and Y be sets of women and men, respectively. For simplicity, we assume |X| = |Y | = n. Each player v ∈ X ∪ Y holds a preference list or ranking P v -a linear order on a subset of the members of the opposite sex. Denote the set of all player's preferences by P = {P v |v ∈ X ∪ Y }. We refer to the players u that appear on v's preference list P v as v's acceptable partners. We call P a set of complete if each player ranks all players of the opposite sex. If a man m precedes m ′ on woman w's preference list, we write m ≻ w m ′ , and we say that w prefers m to m ′ . We assume that preferences are symmetric in the sense that if m appears in P w , then w appears in P m . We define the communication graph G = (V, E) for a set of preferences P to be
A marriage M ⊂ E is a matching on G-i.e. a set of edges in E such that no two edges share a vertex. Given a marriage M and (m, w) ∈ M , we call m and w partners and write p(w) = m and p(m) = w. Given preferences and a marriage M , we say that an edge (m, w) ∈ E is a blocking pair if (m, w) / ∈ M , but m and w mutually prefer each other to their partners in M ; that is, m ≻ w p(w) and w ≻ m p(m).
By convention, we assume each unmatched player (p(v) = ∅) prefers all acceptable partners to being without a partner. A marriage which contains no blocking pairs is stable. For a communication graph G = (V, E), we denote the degree of v ∈ V by deg v, which is the number of players that appear on v's preference list. We take the parameter C to be an upper bound for the ratio of maximum to minimum degree vertices v ∈ V :
For the stable marriage problem, C is at least the ratio of the length of longest to shortest preferences lists. In particular, in the case of complete preferences we may take C = 1.
Almost stable marriages
We are primarily concerned with finding marriages which are "almost stable" in the sense that they induce relatively few blocking pairs. We give a definition of almost stability given by Eriksson and Häggström [1] , modified to allow for incomplete preference lists.
Definition 2.1. Given ε ≥ 0, we say that a marriage M is (1 − ε)-stable with respect to preferences P if M induces at most ε |E| blocking pairs with respect to P.
We refer to the problem of finding a marriage which is (1 − ε)-stable for fixed ε > 0 as the almost stable marriage problem . We remark that for ε = 0, a 1-stable marriage corresponds precisely to the classical stable marriage definition.
Remark 2.2. Again, we reiterate that there is no consensus in the literature on the precise definition of almost stability. For example, FKPS [2] compare the number of blocking pairs to |M |, the size of the marriage rather than |E|, as we do. Since FKPS only consider bounded preference lists, their notion and our notion of almost stability agree up to a constant factor. Remark 2.3. Kipnis and Patt-Shamir [7] define a pair (m, w) to be ε-blocking if they rank each other an ε-fraction better than their assigned partners. A matching is then almost stable if it does not contain any ε-blocking pairs. Using this definition, Kipnis and Patt-Shamir prove an Ω( √ n/ log n) round lower bound for their version of the almost stable marriage problem.
That we are able to achieve an O(1) round algorithm for the almost stable marriage problem using Definition 2.1 bolsters the use of Definition 2.1 for almost stability.
Computational model
We describe our algorithm in terms of the CONGEST model described by Peleg [9] . In this distributed computational model, each player v ∈ X ∪ Y represents a processor. Given preferences P, the communication links between the players are given by the set of edges E in the communication graph G. Communication is performed in synchronous rounds. Each communication round occurs in three stages. First, each processor receives messages (if any) sent from its neighbors in G during the previous round. Next, each processor performs local calculations based on its internal state and any received messages. We make no restrictions on the complexity of local computations. Finally, each processor sends short (O(log n) bit) messages to its neighbors in G-the processor may send distinct messages to distinct neighbors. In the CON-GEST model, we are exclusively concerned with the number of communication rounds needed to solve a problem-i.e. the round complexity of an algorithm. Since the CONGEST model makes computational assumptions which are unrealistic in practice (for example, each processor is computationally unbounded), we also consider the run-time of ASM with respect to more innocuous computational assumptions. In analyzing the runtime of ASM, we shall assume that each processor can perform the following operations in constant time:
1. basic integer arithmetic 2. choose a log n-bit integer uniformly at random from a specified range 3. send/receive a single message to/from one neighbor consisting of (a) a short message (e.g., PROPOSE, ACCEPT, REJECT), or (b) the id of a player 4. query a player's own preferences, specifically "Which player do I rank in position i?" and "What is my rank of player v?"
Even with respect to these simple operations, the ASM algorithm will be shown to run in linear time in the length of each player's preference list.
Almost maximal matchings
In our algorithm, we require a subroutine which finds an "almost maximal matching" in a communication graph.
Here we make precise a notion almost maximal matching. Let G = (V, E) be a communication graph. A matching M is a maximal matching if it is not properly contained in any larger matching. Equivalently, M is maximal if and only if every v ∈ V satisfies precisely one of the following conditions:
We define an "almost maximal" matching to be a matching in which a large fraction of the vertices in G satisfy one of the above conditions. In 1986, Israeli and Itai [6] described a distributed algorithm which finds a maximal matching in a graph using O(log n) communication rounds (where |V | = n). By truncating Israeli and Itai's algorithm after a bounded number of steps, we obtain the following theorem. Details of the proof are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.5. Let G be a communication graph and 0 < δ, η < 1. Then there exists a distributed algorithm AMM(G, δ, η) which, with probability at least 1− δ, finds a (1− η)-maximal matching in G using O(− log(δη)) communication rounds. The run-time of this algorithm is O(− log(δη) max deg(G)). Definition 2.6. We call a node v ∈ V unmatched if v does not satisfy property 1 or 2 preceding definition 2.4 in the matching found by AMM(G, δ, η).
By Theorem 2.5, AMM(G, δ, η) induces at most η |V | unmatched players with probability at least 1 − δ.
Algorithm description
In this section, we describe in detail the almost stable marriage algorithm, ASM. We break the main algorithm into subroutines, MarriageRound and GreedyMatch. In Section 3.1 we introduce notation, and describe the internal state of each processor during the execution of the ASM algorithm. Section 3.2 contains a description of the main subroutine used in ASM: GreedyMatch. Finally, Section 3.3 contains a description of ASM and its MarriageRound subroutine.
Notation
In our algorithm, we assume that each player is represented by an independent processor. Each processor has a unique id and a gender (male or female) both of which are known to that processor. At each step of the algorithm, we specify the state of each processor as well as any messages the processor might send or receive. The state of a player v consists of:
• Quantized preferences Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k where we denote Q = Q i . Initially Q 1 is the set of v's deg v/k favorite men, Q 2 is her next favorite deg(v)/k, and so on. We call Q i w's ith quantile. For m ∈ Q i , we write q(m) = i. If we wish to make explicit the player to whom the preferences belong, we may adorn these symbols with a superscript. For example, Q v i is v's ith quantile. Throughout the execution of the algorithm, elements may be removed from Q and the Q i s, but elements will never be added to any of these sets.
• A partner p (possibly empty). The partner p is v's current partner in the matching M our algorithm constructs. To emphasize that p is player v's partner, we will write p(v). The (partial) matching M produced by the algorithm at any step is given by M = {(p(w), w)|w ∈ X, p(w) = ∅} Additionally, subroutines of our algorithm will require each processor to store the following variables:
• A set G 0 of "neighbors" of the opposite sex which correspond to accepted proposals.
• A partner p 0 in a matching found in the graph determined by G 0 .
Thus each player knows their preferences, partners (if any) as well as any accepted proposals from the current round (stored in G 0 ). The men m ∈ Y hold the following additional information:
• As set A of "active" potential mates, initially set to Q 1 .
GreedyMatch(Q, k, A, δ, η)
At the heart of our algorithm is the GreedyMatch subroutine (Algorithm 1). In GreedyMatch, each processor's initial state contains a list Q of their rankings of remaining potential mates and a partner p (possibly empty). The men additionally each hold a set A of the women in their best non-empty quantile. GreedyMatch works in 5 rounds which are described in Algorithm 1.
The men propose to all women in A by sending each w ∈ A the message PROPOSE.
Round 2: Each women receiving proposals responds with the message ACCEPT to all proposals from her best quantile Q i from which at least one man proposed in Round 1. 
Round 5:
The men remove all w from whom they received the message REJECT from their preferences Q, the various Q i and A. If a man m receives a rejection from his match p(m) from a previous round, he sets p ← ∅.
The following lemma follows immediately from the description of GreedyMatch.
Lemma 3.1. Once a woman w has p(w) = ∅ in some execution of GreedyMatch, she is guaranteed to always have p(w) = ∅ after each subsequent execution of GreedyMatch, unless she is unmatched in some call to AMM. Further, once matched, she will only accept proposals from men in a strictly higher quantile than her current p(w).
3.3 MarriageRound(Q, C, k, δ, η) and ASM(P, C, ε, δ)
In this section, we describe how to use GreedyMatch as a subroutine to find an almost stable marriage. The subroutine MarriageRound (Algorithm 2) calls GreedyMatch directly. For the men, MarriageRound initializes A to be the (remaining) members of each man m's best non-empty quantile Q i . The idea is to iterate the GreedyMatch subroutine until all men have A = ∅. This will occur precisely when all men have either been matched or rejected by all women in A. For a woman w, this will occur when she fails to receive any proposals in an iteration of GreedyMatch. We will argue that k iterations of GreedyMatch suffice. The main routine ASM (Algorithm 3) iterates MarriageRound until a suitably large matching M is found. ASM takes parameters the player's preference list P , an upper bound for the ratio of longest to shortest preference lists C, the desired approximation factor ε, and the error probability δ. For simplicity, we assume that ε −1 ∈ N.
MarriageRound(Q, p, k, δ) end for 4 Performance guarantees
Round and Run-time
The goal of this section is to prove the following run-time guarantee for ASM. The bulk of the complexity in ASM comes from the GreedyMatch subroutine. Indeed, ASM and MarriageRound essentially just iterate GreedyMatch a specified number of times with the proper parameters. Proof. In rounds 1, 2, 4 and 5, each player sends at most one message of the type specified in Section 2.3 to each player. Round 3 calls AMM(G, δ, η) once, which terminates after O(− log(δη)) rounds by Theorem 2.5. 
Approximation
In this section, we prove the following approximation guarantee. Theorem 4.3. For any preferences P and numbers ε, δ > 0, C ≥ 1, the marriage M output by ASM(P, C, ε, δ) is (1 − ε)-stable with probability at least 1 − δ.
In order to show that the marriage M output by ASM(P, ε, δ, C) is almost stable, we must show that M induces relatively few blocking pairs. To this end, we consider different groups of players separately and show that each group induces few blocking pairs. Proof. To prove the lemma, we will show that the size of the compliment of Y b i is increasing in i. This follows from three observations. First if a man m is rejected, then he will never become un-rejected. Second, if a woman w is matched in some round of ASM, she will remain matched by Lemma 3.1. Thus the number of matched women (and hence the number of matched men) is weakly increasing in i. Finally, if a man is ever unmatched, he will remain unmatched. Thus the set of bad men is also weakly decreasing. Proof. We prove this by counting the number of rejections sent after j iterations of the loop. Since the women can send a combined total of at most |E| rejections, a lower bound on the number of rejections after j iterations gives an upper bound on the number of iterations until most men are matched, unmatched or rejected.
Suppose there were b bad men after j iterations. By Lemma 4.4, this implies that there were at least b bad men after each iteration up to the j-th iteration. Note that each bad man m ∈ Y must have been rejected by all women in their highest (previously) non-empty quantile Q m i . Since each Q m i contains deg m/k women, after j rounds, the women must have sent at least jb min deg G/k total rejections in the first j rounds. Since combined, the women cannot send more than |E| rejections, we must have
Thus, taking b = ε 3C n, we find
Therefore, after C 2 k 2 iterations of the loop in ASM, at most ε 3C n men are bad, as desired.
Lemma 4.6. At the termination of ASM, there are at most ε 3C n unmatched players with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof. ASM makes C 2 k 3 calls to AMM(G 0 , δ/C 2 k 3 , 4/C 3 k 4 ). Applying Theorem 2.5 and the union bound, the probability that any call yields more than 4n/C 3 k 3 unmatched players is at most δ. Thus, with probability at least (1 − δ), there are at most 4n/Ck = ε 3C n unmatched players.
Close and equivalent preferences
Definition 4.7. For a preference structure P, let P(m, w) denote m's rank of w (and symmetrically for P(w, m)). Define the metric d on the set of preferences structures by
By convention, we set d(P, P ′ ) = 1 if there exist a pair (m, w) that rank each other in P but not P ′ or vice versa. We say that P and P ′ are η-close if d(P, P ′ ) ≤ η.
Intuitively, P and P ′ are η-close if all pairs (m, w) rank each other similarly (within η deg v) in the two preferences. We are now ready to state a key lemma which we will use in proving the approximation guarantee in Theorem 4.3.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose P and P ′ are η-close and that M is a (1 − ε)-stable matching for P. Then M is a (1 − ε − 4η)-stable matching for P ′ .
Proof. To prove the lemma, we compute an upper bound for the number of new blocking pairs incurred by each man and woman by changing their preferences. Note that it suffices to show that M has at most 4η |E| more blocking pairs relative to P ′ than relative to P.
Suppose (m 1 , w j ) ∈ M . Let P 1 m denote the preference structure where all m i ∈ Y with i = 1 have the same preferences as P, as do all the women, but where m 1 changes his preferences in accordance with P ′ . Since only m 1 's preferences differ between P 1 m and P, the only new blocking edges (m 1 , w) with respect to P 1 m (that is blocking edges which were not blocking with respect to P but are blocking with respect to P 1 m ) must occur because m 1 preferred w j to w in P but prefers w to w j in P ′ .
Claim. There are at most 2η deg m 1 women that m 1 ranks below w j in P but that rank above w j in P ′ .
To prove the claim, note that by η-closeness, m 1 's rank of w j can decrease by at most η deg m 1 . On the other hand, for w = w j , m 1 's rank of w can increase by at most η deg m 1 . Thus, only women w which rank within 2η deg m 1 of w j can change their relative rank with w j .
By the claim, M can have at most 2η deg m 1 more blocking pairs relative to P 1 m than P. To prove the lemma, we work by iteratively changing players preferences one at a time. Specifically, let P i m be the preference structure where m i ′ with i ′ ≤ i have preferences from P ′ while the remaining players have preferences from P. The above argument shows that P i m can have at most 2η deg m i more blocking pairs than P i−1 m . Applying the analogous procedure for updating the women's preferences (after the men's preferences have been updated) we find that that at most v∈X∪Y 2η deg v = 4η |E| new blocking pairs can be created by changing preferences from P to P ′ . Definition 4.9. We say that two preferences P and P ′ are k-equivalent if they have the same k-quantiles. That is, for each v ∈ X ∪ Y , and each i ∈ [k] we have
Lemma 4.10. If preferences P and P ′ are k-equivalent, then they are (1/k)-close.
Proof. Since P and P ′ have the same k-quantiles, for each pair (m, w), P(m, w) and P ′ (m, w) must reside in the same k-quantile. In particular, this implies that |P(m, w) − P ′ (m, w)| ≤ deg(m)/k. Similarly for P(w, m) and P ′ (w, m).
Corollary 4.11. If P and P ′ are k-equivalent, and M is a (1 − ε)-stable matching for P, then M is a (1 − ε − 4/k)-stable matching for P ′ .
Bounding blocking pairs from matched and unmatched players
In this section, we prove an approximation guarantee for ASM. Blocking pairs in the output M of ASM come from three sources: (1) blocking pairs from matched and rejected players, (2) unmatched players, and (3) bad players. We bound the number of blocking pairs of type (1) by showing that M (along with any rejected players) contains no blocking pairs with respect to preferences P ′ which are k-equivalent to P. We bound the number of blocking pairs of type (2) by appealing to Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. We define P ′ by following the sequence of proposals, acceptances and rejections in an execution of ASM. In particular, we will ensure that the sequence of messages is consistent with an execution of the (extended) Gale-Shapley algorithm with preferences P ′ . For each player v ∈ X ∪ Y , it suffices to define an order on the quantiles Q v 1 , . . . , Q v k . The construction of P ′ for the men and women are different.
Men's preferences: Suppose m ∈ Y has a sequence of matches in his ith quantile Q m i given by w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w j . That is m is matched with w 1 , . . . , w j at some point in the execution of ASM in that order. Then we define an order on Q m i to have w 1 ≻ w 2 ≻ · · · ≻ w j . The remaining w ∈ Q m i satisfy w j ≻ w, but their relative order is arbitrary. That is, in P ′ each man prefers each woman he is paired with in the (temporal) order in which they are matched. He prefers these matches to all other women in Q m i .
Women's preferences: Suppose w ∈ X is paired with m ∈ Q w i at some step in ASM. From the description of ASM, women can be paired with at most one man in each of her quantiles in a given execution (see Lemma 3.1). We define P ′ on Q w i by m ≻ m ′ for all m ′ ∈ Q w i , but the order is otherwise arbitrary.
Lemma 4.12. P and P ′ are k-equivalent.
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of P ′ , as only the preferences within each quantile are modified.
Lemma 4.13. Let M be the (partial) marriage found by ASM, and G ′ the induced subgraph of G consisting of matched and rejected players. Then M contains no blocking pairs in G ′ with respect to preferences P ′ .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, that (m, w) is a blocking pair in G ′ with respect to P ′ . First, consider the case where m is rejected-i.e., p(m) = ∅. Since m ∈ G ′ is rejected, w must have rejected m in some previous call to GreedyMatch. By Lemma 3.1 and the definition of P ′ , this implies that w is matched with someone she prefers to m, contradicting that (m, w) is a blocking pair. Now suppose p(m) = w ′ = w. By Lemma 3.1, w could not have rejected m in any call to GreedyMatch (and in particular, m and w could not previously been each others' partner). Consider the last GreedyMatch in which m proposed to w. If m was paired with another woman w ′′ in this GreedyMatch, then we must have w ′′ = w ′ , for otherwise m would have proposed to w again after being rejected by w ′′ . Thus, by the definition of P ′ , m prefers w ′ to w, a contradiction. If m is unpaired after this call to GreedyMatch, then either w was paired with someone she prefers to m, or m and w are unpaired. In either case, we arrive at a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
We are now ready to prove the approximation guarantee for ASM given in Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let M be the marriage output by ASM(P, C, ε, δ). We must show that with probability at least 1 − δ, M is (1 − ε) stable with respect to preferences P. Let V b and V u denote the sets bad and unmatched players, respectively. By Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, we have |V b | , |V u | ≤ ε 3C n. The number of blocking pairs incident with V b , say, is bounded by
A similar inequality holds for blocking pairs incident with V u , hence combined these two sets contribute at most 2ε |E| /3 blocking pairs. Let P ′ be the preferences described in Section 4.2.3. By Lemma 4.13, the only blocking pairs in M with respect to P ′ must be incident with V b or V u , hence M is (1 − 2ε/3)-stable with respect to P ′ . Thus, for k = 12ε −1 , applying Corollary 4.11 and Lemma 4.12, we find that M is (1 − 2ε/3 − ε/3)-stable with respect to P, as desired. 
Commentary
A reasonable critique of ASM is that it requires the parameter C ≥ max deg G min deg G . Since C encodes some global information about the structure of the communication graph G, using C as a parameter in ASM is somewhat unnatural.
Open Problem 5.1. Can Theorem 1.1 be extended to not depend on the parameter C?
In our analysis of ASM, we use C to bound the number of potential blocking pairs induced by unmatched and bad players. Since we do not control which players are unmatched or bad, we trivially bound the number of blocking pairs from an unmatched or bad player by max deg G. It is conceivable that by locally ensuring that players with relatively long preferences lists (and hence the potential to contribute to many blocking pairs) are not unmatched or bad, we can avoid using C as a parameter to obtain a generalization of Theorem 1.1.
Since the run-time of ASM is linear in the input size for each processor, it is asymptotically optimal for algorithms which require sequential access to the input. However faster algorithms may exist if each processor is granted random access to its preference list.
Open Problem 5.2. Is there a sub-linear time distributed algorithm for the almost stable marriage problem using random access to players' preferences?
